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In this paper, we review the burgeoning but dispersed literature on chief executive officer (CEO) 
advice seeking, which has important effects on strategic decision making, the CEO’s and the 
board of directors’ effectiveness, and firms’ entrepreneurial orientation, innovativeness, and 
financial performance. We synthesize research findings about the key features of CEO advice 
seeking and its antecedents and outcomes across multiple levels of analysis. On the basis of our 
review, we identify important research gaps and develop a future research agenda that outlines 
new research questions and empirical foci that extend the current scope of analysis. We also 
highlight promising new theories and underutilized methods suitable for this area of research. 
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The job of the chief executive officer (CEO) involves making and executing decisions 
under change and uncertainty and dealing with strategic issues that are complex, ambiguous, 
and consequential. To surmount these challenges and make astute decisions, CEOs regularly 
seek advice from a variety of individuals and groups, a phenomenon that has attracted increas-
ing attention from management scholars. As a result, there is a growing literature examining 
various aspects of CEO advice seeking, defined here as any interaction of the CEO with 
another person or group ostensibly directed at accessing knowledge deemed helpful for deal-
ing with a problem (cf. Heyden, van Doorn, Reimer, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2013).
Advice seeking is ubiquitous whenever people are confronted with important and difficult 
decisions (for reviews on advice seeking as a general phenomenon, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006; MacGeorge, Feng, & Guntzviller, 2016). However, advice seeking by a CEO is a dis-
tinct phenomenon in many respects given the nature of the CEO’s position. It is highly con-
sequential because the decisions made by CEOs affect a large number and variety of 
constituents. It also occurs through a distinct network of advisers from inside and outside the 
organization, and some of the advice is channeled through structures (e.g., a board) that gov-
ern the CEO’s work.
Research indicates that CEOs seek advice from a range of advisers, including members of 
the top management team (TMT), the board of directors, lower-level managers, CEOs of 
other firms, and other external contacts (e.g., Arendt, Priem, & Ndofor, 2005; Garg & 
Eisenhardt, 2017; Kor & Mesko, 2013; Ma & Seidl, 2018; McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 
2008). Advice-seeking behavior is shown to have significant effects on CEO decision mak-
ing and beyond, including the choice of strategy, CEO and board effectiveness, entrepreneur-
ship orientation and innovativeness of the company, and firm performance (e.g., Acquaah, 
2007; Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; McDonald et al., 2008; 
Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong, & Kor, 2014).
Given its strategic and organizational implications, an in-depth understanding of CEO 
advice seeking is valuable for theory and practice. The extant literature has generated rich yet 
disconnected and isolated insights into CEO advice-seeking behavior; as a result, we lack a 
coherent and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Currently, research insights 
are dispersed across different streams of the management literature, including strategic deci-
sion making, upper echelons, corporate governance, and executive networks. Due to the dif-
ferent empirical foci and theoretical lenses utilized in these streams, studies have focused on 
various aspects of CEO advice seeking, although some commonalities are also noted. For 
example, upper echelons studies focus on CEO advice seeking from the executive team mem-
bers and how these interactions may affect strategic choice and adaptation (e.g., Kor & Mesko, 
2013; Mooney & Amason, 2011), whereas corporate governance research focuses on the 
CEO’s advice interactions with board members and examines their impact on governance 
effectiveness and firm performance (e.g., Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Krause, Semadeni, & 
Cannella, 2013). Executive network research is centered on CEO advice seeking from exter-
nal advice sources, exploring the similarities between the CEO and the adviser profiles and 
their outcomes (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2003; McDonald et al., 2008). In addition, stud-
ies adopt different levels of analysis. For example, research on CEO advice seeking in the 
upper echelons and corporate governance literatures primarily focuses on the group or firm 
level (e.g., Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2015; van Doorn, Heyden, & Volberda, 2017), whereas 
studies in the strategic decision-making literature (e.g., Arendt et al., 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989) 
and the executive network literature (e.g., Bridwell-Mitchell & Lant, 2014; Walter, Levin, & 
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Murnighan, 2015) usually choose the strategic decision or the act of advice seeking as the unit 
of analysis. Each of these literature streams offers rich insights, but we have reached a point 
where taking stock of and integrating what we know is essential. A synthesis of the dispersed 
and disconnected research insights and the charting of unexplored areas is timely and benefi-
cial for developing a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of CEO advice seeking.
Accordingly, with this review, we provide an overview of the research on CEO advice 
seeking and synthesize insights generated by various literature streams. In this synthesis, we 
first ground the phenomenon by discussing the uniqueness and key features of CEO advice 
seeking. The main body of the review is organized into two sections: one on the antecedents 
and one on the outcomes of CEO advice seeking. As shown in Figure 1, the antecedents sec-
tion provides a review and synthesis of research about (1) strategic context, (2) governance 
context, and (3) the CEO’s personal context, as key drivers of CEO advice seeking. The 
outcomes section reviews research on the consequences of CEO advice seeking on (4) stra-
tegic decisions, (5) the organizational level, (6) the group level (TMT and board), and (7) the 
individual/CEO level. Figure 1 illustrates the directional flow and the causal nature of the 
relationships where the antecedents trigger CEO advice seeking, which then has conse-
quences at multiple levels. Based on the research gaps revealed by the review, the future 
research section establishes a future research agenda. As indicated by the dotted rectangles 
and italic fonts in Figure 1, the new research areas complement past research in forming an 
extended and integrative framework of CEO advice seeking. Moreover, this research agenda 
highlights promising new theories and underutilized methods for this area of research.
Identifying the Literature
To identify the literature on CEO advice seeking, we searched the Web of Science, which 
covers the Social Science Citation Index database, for relevant studies. CEO advice seeking 
is not a clearly bounded domain of research with established key words; therefore, we 
Figure 1
CEO Advice-Seeking Framework and Future Research Agenda
Note: Dotted rectangles and texts in italics indicate new areas of research. CEO = chief executive officer; TMT = 
top management team.
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conducted a broad search using search terms aimed at cutting across different streams of the 
literature. Our search proceeded in four steps. First, we searched the database for papers with 
the following search terms in their title, key words, or abstract:
(a) one of three search terms1—“CEO*” “executive*,” or “top manage*”—in combination with 
one of the following search terms:
(b) “advi*,” “feedback seeking,” “counsel*,” “CEO* network*,” “social network*,” “social tie*,” 
“informal tie*,” “internal tie*,” “external tie*,” “social capital,” “access to information,” 
“source* of information,” “CEO-board relation*,” “CEO-board interface*,” “CEO-TMT rela-
tion*,” or “CEO-TMT interface*.”
The combination of search terms in parts a and b was aimed at capturing all studies that 
are potentially related to CEO advice seeking. Following the example of other prominent 
reviews (e.g., Bromiley & Rau, 2016), we restricted our search to papers in high-impact 
journals. These include all management journals in the Financial Times 50 list and additional 
journals with high citation rates (for the list of journals, see Table S1 in the online supple-
ment). This broad-level search resulted in an initial list of 201 papers. Second, guided by our 
definition of CEO advice seeking, we reviewed the identified papers for their relevance to 
our topic. We excluded studies that did not address CEO advice seeking. For example, many 
TMT or board studies included “advice” in their abstracts because the study itself contained 
“advice” for practitioners or the articles referred to the board’s “advice” role or board/execu-
tive “social capital” or “social network,” without elaborating on CEO advice seeking specifi-
cally (e.g., drivers, process, or outcomes of CEO advice seeking). This reduced the initial list 
of papers to 55 studies. Third, to include the most recent studies, we searched the websites of 
all included journals for forthcoming papers on CEO advice seeking and identified one addi-
tional study. In the final step, we checked the references of the identified studies to look for 
further relevant ones. As a result, 9 more studies were added. Thus, our final list comprises 
65 studies, which forms a comprehensive yet manageable base for the review paper.
CEO Advice Seeking as a Phenomenon
Uniqueness of CEO Advice Seeking
Advice seeking is ubiquitous when people make important decisions or deal with difficult 
problems (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; MacGeorge, Feng, & Guntzviller, 2016). It serves as an 
effective way of coping with situations where people lack relevant knowledge, expertise, and 
resources or experience anxiety (Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012). Because of its perva-
siveness in social life, advice seeking has been widely studied in different disciplines, includ-
ing research studies in communication, social networks, business, psychology, and linguistics 
(MacGeorge & Van Swol, 2018). The broader literature on advice indicates that advice seek-
ing is motivated by task-related, personal, relational, and cultural reasons and may result in a 
spectrum of outcomes, ranging from increased “coping capacity and relational closeness [at 
the individual level] to organizational productivity and creativity and the development of eco-
nomic policies that affect entire countries” at macro levels (MacGeorge & Van Swol, 2018: 4).
While any individual can seek advice, CEO advice seeking is unique due to the nature of 
the CEO’s job in an organizational context. First, CEOs are accountable for strategic 
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decisions and the overall course of their firms. In contrast to general advice seeking, CEO 
advice seeking has long-term and far-reaching consequences for various constituents of the 
organization (Heyden et al., 2013; McDonald et al., 2008), which makes CEOs more con-
scious of their advice-seeking behavior (Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017). Second, being uniquely 
positioned at the boundary of the organization, CEOs are dually exposed to internal and 
external sources of advice, making the choice between these types of advice sources a dis-
tinct aspect of their advice seeking (Arendt et al., 2005). Third, the governance arrangements 
and TMT structure and links around CEOs present unique opportunities and constraints for 
their advice seeking. The board of directors and TMT are often regarded as “official” advis-
ers to the CEOs. On the one hand, this can facilitate advice seeking for the CEO, as these 
advisers are usually readily available. On the other hand, the underlying expectations and 
patterns of these relationships may partially restrict the CEO’s discretion in selecting his or 
her advisers. Thus, when and how CEOs seek advice from official advisers comprises a dis-
tinct yet substantive aspect of CEO advice seeking (Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Sundaramurthy 
et al., 2014). Finally, CEOs regularly receive a large amount of data that they have to process 
and interpret to make decisions, often in a speedy manner. Interpretation and sense making 
of such data and information often involve seeking advice from others.
For these reasons, CEO advice seeking differs from general advice seeking and deserves 
specific research attention. In the following section, we discuss the distinct features of CEO 
advice seeking before reviewing how they relate to various antecedents and outcomes.
Key Features of CEO Advice Seeking
Advice seeking is a common behavior in which CEOs engage when they face difficulties 
in making strategic decisions or dealing with critical issues (Alexiev, Volberda, Jansen, & 
Van Den Bosch, in press). The literature shows that CEOs frequently seek advice on strategic 
issues concerning a company’s current or future strategy, such as issues about diversification, 
acquisitions, innovation, and outsourcing (e.g., Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 
2010; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Jones, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia, 2008; Kroll, Walters, 
& Wright, 2008; Li & Aguilera, 2008; Mol & Kotabe, 2011). CEOs also seek advice on criti-
cal operational issues, albeit less frequently, when their managerial team lacks the relevant 
operational expertise (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 1996; Krause et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, CEOs ask for advice about leadership challenges. For example, Shen (2003) 
has argued that in their early years of tenure, CEOs may seek advice on leadership issues 
from their boards. Beyond typical business and leadership matters, CEOs seek advice on 
personal issues when they are experiencing marital difficulties, discord with their children, 
or sickness in family (McDonald & Westphal, 2011).
Sources of advice. A key aspect of research on CEO advice seeking is the choice of the 
advice source. Given the large number of ties that CEOs typically have, a core research ques-
tion involves from whom CEOs actually seek advice. Our review suggests that CEOs con-
sider a range of individuals as potential advisers, including their TMT members, lower-level 
managers, outside board members, CEOs of other firms, politicians, personal friends, and 
family members (e.g., Acquaah, 2007; Fiegener, 2010; McDonald & Westphal, 2003; West-
phal, 1999). These advice contacts have different types of information, expertise, cognitive 
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perspectives, and network access, which can be uniquely valuable to the CEO. The literature 
offers a number of categorizations of these advice sources and explains why these respec-
tive categories of advisers are consulted and what consequences may ensue. The most com-
mon categorization distinguishes between internal and external advisers—that is, whether 
the advice contact is a member of the CEO’s organization (e.g., Alexiev et al., 2010; Cao, 
Simsek, & Zhang, 2010; Heyden et al., 2013). The general tenet is that external advisers 
provide the CEO with information that is more novel, timelier, and less distorted than the 
information received from internal advisers (Arendt et al., 2005). Studies demonstrate that 
external advice sources, such as CEOs of other firms, business partners, governmental offi-
cials, community leaders, as well as participants in business roundtables and associations, 
provide a useful input for the CEO’s decisions (Acquaah, 2007; Haunschild & Beckman, 
1998; Heavey & Simsek, 2015; McDonald & Westphal, 2010; Mol & Kotabe, 2011; van 
Doorn et al., 2017).
As opposed to external advice, advice from internal sources is often viewed as less objec-
tive and novel but is more prized by the CEO for being firm-specific and easier to incorporate 
into the decision-making process (Arendt et al., 2005). Reflecting tacit knowledge of the 
company’s idiosyncratic resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities (Penrose, 1959), inter-
nally sourced advice can be more insightful in choosing among alternative strategic direc-
tions and achieving effective implementation. However, Menon and Pfeffer (2003) show 
that, in competitive organizations, there is bias against internal knowledge, which gets closer 
scrutiny than external knowledge and is subject to undervaluation.
Research has further examined the categories of internal and external advisers and distin-
guishes between intra- and extraindustry contacts, arguing that extraindustry contacts pro-
vide CEOs with ideas that deviate from common assumptions and beliefs in the industry 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Yoo & Reed, 2015). In addition, G. L. Chen, Trevino, and 
Hambrick (2009) suggest that the corporate elite—specifically, CEOs of large firms and 
financial institutions and high-level government officials—may be treated as one homoge-
neous category of external advisers, as they tend to provide similar advice because of their 
shared elite views.
Scholars also differentiate among types of internal advisers, such as top managers, other 
organizational members, and board members. Studies show that, in seeking advice, CEOs 
distinguish among TMT members. In a study of technology firms in high-velocity environ-
ments, Eisenhardt (1989) observed that CEOs often solicit advice from all TMT members but 
rely more heavily on the advice of a few members, referred to as the CEOs’ senior counsel-
ors. Similarly, Mooney and Amason (2011) find that in advice seeking, CEOs typically focus 
on a subgroup of the TMT comprising managers with whom they have strong ties or a trust-
based relationship. These findings relax the old assumption about the CEO collaborating 
with a close-knit TMT, where all members interact and have similar levels of influence on the 
CEO (Arendt et al., 2005).
In addition, the board of directors is a major source of advice for the CEO and senior 
managers on strategic issues (Bezemer, Maassen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007; Johnson, 
Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013; Westphal, 1999). Outside (nonexecutive) board members may be 
viewed as a hybrid category of advisers that blends internal and external adviser features, as 
these directors have formal ties with the company through the board, which gives them 
access to critical internal information. However, their in-depth expertise and networks still lie 
outside the firm, often in different company and/or industry domains. In some ways, they 
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may be viewed as insider-outsider advisers. Studies also indicate that the board chairperson 
can be an important source of advice and a mentor for the CEO (Dulewicz, Gay, & Taylor, 
2007; Krause, 2017; Stewart, 1991), even though the nature of CEO-board collaboration can 
vary among firms (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). In the new venture context, studies dem-
onstrate that venture capitalist (VC) board members can be important advisers on strategic 
and operational issues (Barney et al., 1996; Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & Taylor, 1993; 
Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza & Gupta, 1994; Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermier, 1996). Another 
hybrid category involves the so-called most trusted advisors in family firms who serve as 
mediators in a triangle of management, board, and family members with conflicting needs 
(Strike & Rerup, 2016). These advisers draw on their internal knowledge and social capital 
to balance the weight of competing voices in collective sense making.
Research also shows that some of the advisers who are “in principle” available to the 
CEO are indeed latent sources of advice (Bridwell-Mitchell & Lant, 2014). Ma and Seidl 
(2018) find that when new CEOs face constraints in seeking advice from their TMT mem-
bers due to a lack of trust, they rely on board directors and (lower-level) staff members for 
advice. Similarly, Kim and Lu (2018) show that when CEOs face restrictions in appointing 
particular individuals to their boards as advisers, they turn to their hand-picked TMT mem-
bers for advice.
Research has also underscored the importance of the CEO’s established network of advisers, 
comprising individuals with whom the CEO has strong ties (Nebus, 2006). Studies show that 
executives predominantly rely on their advice network and reach out to the advisers beyond 
that network only in exceptional cases (Levin, Walter, & Murnighan, 2011; Walter et al., 2015), 
because strong ties and trust facilitate an open flow of communication, in-depth exchange, and 
the transfer of tacit knowledge. In line with these findings, studies on CEO-board relations 
indicate that CEOs ask more advice from board members with whom they have strong ties 
(Jones et al., 2008; Westphal, 1999; Wu, 2008). However, there is value in reaching out to 
advice sources beyond the established advice network (Levin & Walter, 2019; Levin et al., 
2011; Walter et al., 2015). Focusing on “dormant ties,” defined as people with whom the advice 
seeker has not communicated for a long time, Levin et al. (2011) demonstrate that advice 
sources beyond the existing network give CEOs access to more novel insights.
Type of advice. Another important aspect of advice seeking is the type of advice, which 
refers to the nature of the knowledge contained in the advice. Ma and Seidl (2018), for exam-
ple, distinguish between advice that provides the CEO with critical information and advice 
that provides evaluations of alternative options. Arendt et al. (2005) distinguish among 
types of advice according to the different stages of the decision making for which advice is 
sought—that is, gathering information, processing or interpreting information, and recom-
mending and making the decision. In addition, Garg and Eisenhardt (2017) observe that 
CEOs may ask specific directors for their interpretation of other directors’ input. Last, advice 
may relate to the process of strategic decision making. For example, McNulty and Pettigrew 
(1999) describe that CEOs solicit advice from their boards on how to conduct strategic plan-
ning and which methods to use in developing strategy.
Nature of advice interactions. When seeking advice, CEOs may not only choose among 
alternative sources and types of advice but also have a preference for specific types of advice 
interactions. An important aspect of advice interaction is the formality (or informality) of the 
8  Journal of Management / Month XXXX
interaction between the CEO and the adviser. Research suggests that informal interactions 
with advisers may enable the CEO to obtain better advice thanks to open communication 
(Arendt et al., 2005; Mooney & Amason, 2011; Sapienza, 1992). These interactions provide 
“an atmosphere conducive to free exchange of information” in the advice process (Sapienza, 
1992: 12). Focusing on advice seeking from TMT members, Mooney and Amason (2011: 
36) further add that keeping the advice interactions informal provides the CEO with latitude 
in selecting advisers in the TMT, because “the CEO need not make clear” the reasons for 
selectively seeking advice from some TMT members but not others. CEOs’ interactions with 
external advisers tend to be informal (Arendt et al., 2005), whereas interactions with hybrid 
or internal advisers, such as outside directors or TMT members, can be either formal (e.g., 
via structured board or executive team meetings) or informal.
In addition, research distinguishes between dyadic and group advice interactions. 
Although it is often assumed that CEO advice seeking is dyadic (e.g., Arendt et al., 2005), 
it can also take place in a group context, such as the boardroom (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 
1999). Seeking advice from the board as a group may enable the CEO to better leverage 
different perspectives and the expertise of board members (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; 
Minichilli, Zattoni, Nielsen, & Huse, 2012). However, comparing group and dyadic advice 
interactions, Garg and Eisenhardt (2017) find that dyadic interactions with individual board 
members allow the CEO to obtain a better quality of advice by enabling an in-depth 
exchange of thoughts and encouraging closer consideration of the director’s ideas. These 
dyadic interactions also help the CEO preserve his or her discretion or influence in the deci-
sion process, whereas the effects of group-based advice interactions during board meeting 
can be more difficult to control.
Antecedents of CEO Advice Seeking
As shown in Figure 1, our review identifies three types of antecedents of CEO advice 
seeking: (1) the strategic context in which the firm is operating, (2) the governance context 
in which the CEO performs, and (3) the CEO’s personal context and attributes. We elaborate 
on these three antecedents, and the online supplement (see Table S2 in the online supple-
ment) tabulates their studies.
Strategic Context
The first set of antecedents of CEO advice seeking involves the strategic context in which 
the company operates, and it comprises three key factors (i.e., environmental, strategy-
related, and organizational factors) that impose particular knowledge and information 
requirements on CEO decision making. First, environmental factors drive CEO advice seek-
ing by generating informational needs for strategic decision making and strategy execution 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Often relying on information processing theory, this research conceptual-
izes CEO advice seeking as “rationalistic, goal-oriented and directed towards information 
processing” (Alexiev et al., in press) and focuses on how information requirements in a 
specific decision context drive the CEO’s choice of advice sources. Accordingly, in uncertain 
environments, CEOs rely more heavily on external contacts (or hybrid contacts, such as out-
side directors) for strategic advice, because with a diverse set of expertise and perspectives, 
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these contacts enable CEOs to acquire novel information, identify emergent trends, and 
develop strategic alternatives (e.g., Heyden et al., 2013; Jones & Cannella, 2011). Specifically, 
Arendt and colleagues (2005) argue that CEOs are likely to prefer external sources of advice 
as the dynamism of the competitive environment increases, because externally acquired 
information and advice are perceived to be less diluted and distorted as compared with infor-
mation coming up the corporate hierarchy. External advice offers a variety of interpretations 
and beliefs embedded in different cognitive schemas and allows for the “framing of issues 
and answers in a broader perspective” (Heyden et al., 2013: 1333).
In stable environments, however, CEOs prefer internal contacts for advice due to stronger 
corporate focus on internal issues and strategy implementation (Arendt et al. 2005; Jones & 
Cannella, 2011). Internal advisers can pinpoint “key operational and functional concerns that 
may impede effective strategy execution” (Heyden et al., 2013: 1332). Furthermore, Kor and 
Mesko (2013) argue that CEOs face a dilemma when configuring their TMTs and in choos-
ing between tight and loose coupling of the credentials of their senior managers with the 
firm’s dominant logic and strategy. In a dynamic and less predictable environment, a loose 
coupling approach—which involves choosing managers with generic and entrepreneurial 
skills over those with specialized skills—provides more flexibility for strategy pivoting and 
enables the CEO to seek advice and learn from a less-specialized but more enterprising team. 
Loose coupling compromises the efficiency of current strategy implementation but promotes 
CEO advice seeking and learning from a more versatile TMT.
In addition to the industry environment, the institutional environment may shape CEO 
advice-seeking behavior. On the basis of resource dependence theory and its implication for 
the advisory role of the board, Oehmichen, Schrapp, and Wolff (2017) argue that the quality 
of the institutional environment (i.e., information availability and provision of control) 
affects the advisory influence of board members: in countries with weak disclosure require-
ments and impaired access to information, CEOs are more likely to rely on industry expert 
board members as additional channels of information when initiating strategic change. Using 
information processing theory, Sapienza et al. (1996) find that the extent to which CEOs seek 
advice from VCs varies significantly across countries. Specifically, their findings indicate 
that CEOs seek more advice from VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom than in 
France and the Netherlands. The authors attribute this result to cross-country institutional 
differences in the financial sector and, in particular, to higher investor expectations from new 
ventures in the United States and United Kingdom. When this investor orientation is coupled 
with stronger dedication and advisory contributions from the VCs, the result is a higher like-
lihood of CEO advice seeking.
Second, regarding strategy-related factors, studies indicate that a firm’s strategic agenda 
and competitive strategies influence how CEOs select or engage with specific sources of 
advice (Arendt et al., 2005; Bacon-Gerasymenko & Eggers, 2019; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza 
& Gupta, 1994). In particular, Arendt et al. (2005) argue that when firms pursue innovation-
based strategies, such as differentiation or prospector strategies, CEOs rely more on external 
advisers who provide them with the diverse and real-time information for decision making. 
In contrast, when firms follow efficiency-based strategies such as cost-leadership or defender 
strategies, CEOs are likely to opt for internal advisers who can help them address internal 
controls and operations. Likewise, two studies find that in ventures with greater innovation 
and value-chain impact, CEOs seek more advice from VC investors and value their advice to 
10  Journal of Management / Month XXXX
a greater extent (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). Furthermore, Ma and Seidl 
(2018) find that new CEOs’ selection of internal advisers is driven by the expertise require-
ments for the new strategic agenda, such as new priorities and change initiatives.
Third, a range of organizational factors, such as the company’s financial performance, its 
resource dependence, and its stage of development, have been shown to affect CEO advice 
seeking. Studies reveal that poor financial performance can influence CEOs’ preference of 
advice sources in two different and contrasting ways. For instance, poor performance can 
prompt CEOs to seek advice from individuals with relevant expertise to deal with the prob-
lem and improve firm performance (Heyden et al., 2013; Krause et al., 2013; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999). For example, using resource dependence and human capital perspectives, 
Krause et al. (2013) argue that when operational efficiency is declining, the advice from 
operational experts on the board (e.g., chief operational officers or presidents of other firms) 
will be considered more valuable. Similarly, on the basis of information processing theory, 
Heyden et al. (2013: 1336) show that competitive underperformance encourages CEOs to 
seek more advice from internal sources, presumably because their firm-specific knowledge 
can help to “single-out underexploited strengths or firm-specific constraints that may have 
been overlooked.” However, as an alternative explanation, it is also possible that CEOs turn 
to internal advice sources to affirm their previous decisions when they feel anxious about 
their career prospects in the face of poor firm performance (Heyden et al. 2013).
Interestingly, McDonald and Westphal (2003) demonstrate that CEOs may reach out to 
external advice sources for the same type of affirmation. When firm performance is poor, 
CEOs seek advice from external advice contacts, such as CEOs of other companies who are 
their friends or who work in the same industry or share a common functional background. 
Grounding their ideas in social capital and identity theories, the authors argue that vulnerable 
CEOs seek advice from these external contacts (with friendship ties or familiar backgrounds) 
because they expect them to share similar views and affirm their strategic beliefs.
Furthermore, CEO advice seeking is linked with the dependency of an organization on 
particular resources and relationships. Westphal, Boivie, and Chng (2006) show that when 
firms are dependent on other organizations, such as a key buyer, supplier, or competitor, 
CEOs are more likely to establish friendship ties with the executives of those organizations 
as a source of strategic advice and other resources. Similarly, in early-stage ventures where 
there is a stark need of expertise and resources, CEOs seek advice from VCs more so than the 
later-stage venture CEOs (Rosenstein et al., 1993; Sapienza & Gupta, 1994; Sapienza et al., 
1996), which is consistent with resource dependence and information processing theories.
Key insights. As our review highlights, the extant research has devoted significant atten-
tion to the organization’s strategic context as an antecedent to CEO advice seeking, drawing 
mainly on information-processing theory but also selectively on other perspectives, such as 
human and social capital theories and identity theory. A key link in this stream of work, often 
informed by information-processing theory, is that the CEO’s choice of advice source is 
driven by the knowledge and expertise needs imposed by the specific business environment 
and the chosen competitive strategy. CEOs rely more on external contacts (including the 
hybrid outside directors) in dealing with high environmental dynamism or when their firms 
pursue differentiation or innovation-based strategies. These contacts are preferred for their 
ability to provide novel information and a diverse set of expertise with more objective, less 
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filtered views of the focal CEOs’ companies. For efficiency-based strategies and in stable 
environments, a CEO’s preference shifts to internal contacts, as success is more internally 
driven and facilitated by control systems. A second theme suggests that in the face of poor 
financial performance, CEOs will be particularly prone to seek advice. However, on the 
basis of social identity and social capital theories, they show a preference for internal advis-
ers who are less likely to provide fresh thinking and more likely to confirm their previous 
views. Ironically, even when they do ask for advice from external contacts, they confide 
in trusted, friendly contacts or individuals with similar backgrounds. Both routes suggest 
evidence for the confirming hypothesis that under financial duress, CEOs have a tendency 
to seek affirming types of support rather than novel ideas and divergent thinking. If CEOs 
have not already surrounded themselves with advisers who have a diverse set of perspectives 
and ideas, it may be too late to seek these in desperate times. Last, we also observe that a 
void of information and transparency in the broader institutional (country) context increases 
a CEO’s advice seeking. Firm-level dependencies and vulnerabilities, as with new ventures, 
also boost advice seeking from external and hybrid sources, an argument in line with the 
information processing and resource dependence perspectives. These advisory exchanges 
may be linked to the broader institutional or firm-level corporate governance context, which 
we now consider in detail.
Governance Context
The corporate governance context is another important antecedent to CEO advice seeking, 
as it defines the overall work environment and expectations of the CEO, including the CEO’s 
conduct and duties, level of effort, and specific goals and performance targets to be reached. 
Governance context is influenced by the governance mechanisms in effect in the company as 
well as by the norms in the broader institutional governance environment. A highly relevant 
governance mechanism for CEO advice seeking involves the board of directors, which by 
design plays a key role in providing strategic guidance and council to the CEO in conjunction 
with its oversight and monitoring functions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Despite the board’s 
advisory role, as emphasized by resource dependence theory, proactive advice seeking from 
the board can be contingent on a number of factors. One of these factors involves board com-
position and the associated board capital, which is the collective endowment of the board 
members’ human and social capital. As corporate boards around the globe have increasingly 
become more dominated by nonexecutive (outside) directors due to legislation or institutional 
pressures, board capital is a key factor driving the ability of the directors to provide meaning-
ful advice. Depending on their education, industry and functional expertise, and governance 
expertise based on their past or current board appointments, directors possess different human 
and social capital (Bacon-Gerasymenko & Eggers, 2019; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Kroll 
et al., 2008; Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). Such capital equips the board with the requisite 
expertise and access to information networks in advising the CEO on strategic decisions 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Schiehll, Lewellyn, & Muller-Kahle, 2018; Stewart, 1991).
Our review shows that there are two ways whereby board capital affects CEO advice 
seeking. First, based on a range of theoretical perspectives, including resource dependence 
theory, human and social capital theories, and theories of managerial cognition, research 
indicates that the extent to which CEOs proactively ask for advice from the board depends on 
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the relevance of the directors’ expertise regarding the problems at hand. CEOs turn to their 
directors for advice because of their experience in the focal industry or an emerging market, 
in making acquisition deals, or in serving as VCs (Bacon-Gerasymenko & Eggers, 2019; 
Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Joh & Jung, 2018; Johnson et al., 2013; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 
2009; Kroll et al., 2008). Second, the extent to which directors are asked for advice depends 
on the similarity of the directors’ background and attributes to those of the CEO. In particu-
lar, Sundaramurthy et al. (2014) argue that when CEOs and their board members share a 
common educational background or public company board experience, the CEOs are more 
likely to seek advice from the board because a common background helps to create a shared 
understanding and facilitates knowledge exchange. In other words, accessibility of the direc-
tors’ unique expert knowledge may be contingent on the CEO and directors having a com-
mon knowledge of the key expertise domains.
Likewise, the strong social capital of directors can motivate CEOs to seek advice from 
them. Directors’ external ties serve as conduits of information for strategic decision making 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Stevenson & Radin, 2009). 
CEOs connect and seek advice from directors who are valuable sources of information and 
resources and who can signal positively about the legitimacy of the firm and expand its net-
work access (e.g., Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016; Kor & Misangyi, 2008; 
Sundaramurthy et al., 2014; Westphal et al., 2006).
In addition to board capital, research has highlighted the impact of selective aspects of 
board process on CEO advice seeking. One important aspect is the availability of board 
directors for advising. Based on human and social capital as well as managerial cognition 
perspectives, studies show that outside directors’ membership on multiple boards may place 
significant restrictions on their availability (e.g., board attendance and preparedness) and 
general time and attention resources (Bacon-Gerasymenko & Eggers, 2019; Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). Sundaramurthy and colleagues exam-
ined past (accumulated) and current board appointments of directors and found that while a 
high number of current board appointments contributes to directors’ busyness and reduces 
their ability to provide advice, cumulative board experience via past appointments is a valu-
able asset to the CEO and the company (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Sundaramurthy et al., 
2014). Thus, creating an advice-capable board of directors may require appointing directors 
who developed their board expertise and social capital gradually and who are not bogged 
down with too many ongoing board commitments. In addition, using information processing 
theory, Alexiev et al. (in press) argue that the comprehensiveness of the board’s decision 
process—that is, the extent to which the board attempts to be exhaustive or inclusive in its 
decision making—may motivate CEOs to seek more advice from internal and external con-
tacts to incorporate additional perspectives and opinions.
Another governance factor affecting CEO advice seeking is the CEO interest alignment. 
Based on agency theoretic arguments, highlighting the differences between the CEO’s and 
shareholders’ preferences about who the CEO should consult with, studies show that gover-
nance mechanisms influence CEO advice-seeking behavior. Specifically, McDonald et al. 
(2008) find that the use of performance-based incentives (and board monitoring) result in a 
higher rate of CEOs seeking advice from external executives who have different functional 
backgrounds and who are not their friends. Similarly, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) find that 
CEOs are more likely to seek advice from their VCs when their goals are aligned. However, 
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there is also some contrasting evidence about the governance effects on advice seeking. 
Westphal (1999) demonstrates that CEOs have a tendency to seek advice from directors with 
whom they have friendship ties or those who were appointed during the CEOs’ tenure, and 
this tendency is amplified when CEOs’ stock ownership and long-term incentive compensa-
tion rise as a percentage of their total compensation. Thus, under tighter incentive-based 
controls, CEOs may deepen their advice interactions with “trusted directors.” The study also 
indicates that such friendly advice interactions may have a compromising effect on a board’s 
monitoring function. This effect is further compounded by the fact that directors receive 
board (re)nominations when they exhibit subdued monitoring behavior (Westphal & Stern, 
2007).
Last, researchers have examined how the power structure within the upper echelons 
affects CEO advice seeking. Drawing primarily on resource dependence and information 
processing perspectives, studies show that the CEO’s relative power is an important influ-
ence on advice seeking even though the direction of that influence is ambiguous (H. L. Chen, 
2014; Jones & Cannella, 2011; Ma & Seidl, 2018). For instance, Jones and Cannella (2011) 
argue that with higher power differentials, CEOs feel less of a necessity to seek advice from 
their boards or TMTs. However, H. L. Chen (2014) submits that powerful CEOs influence 
director selection by nominating their friends or other individuals with whom they have 
strong social ties. The trust and loyalty of these directors in turn facilitate CEO advice seek-
ing from the board. In support of the second view, Ma and Seidl (2018) find that newly 
appointed CEOs with the power to reconfigure their TMTs are more likely to seek advice 
from their TMTs.
Thus, CEOs may use their power to configure their working surroundings, such as board 
or TMT composition, in a way that establishes a network of trusted advisers. Both views 
acknowledge the possibility of powerful CEOs shaping boards and TMTs for friendly sup-
port (see also Westphal & Zajac, 1995), but the former view predicts less advice seeking by 
the CEO from upper echelon contacts, while the latter predicts more advice seeking from 
this group.
Last, with respect to board power and control, research indicates the presence of unin-
tended consequences. While not focusing on CEO advice seeking directly, McDonald and 
Westphal (2010) show that greater board control may weaken CEOs’ social identification 
with the corporate elite and reduce their willingness to provide help to other CEOs. An 
important second-order implication of this board power effect is the system-wide reduced 
access of CEOs to help from other fellow CEOs.
Key insights. Research examining governance factors as a driver of CEO advice seeking 
has largely focused on the role of boards of directors and managerial incentives. In explain-
ing advice seeking from the board, studies often adopt information processing, resource 
dependence, and human and social capital theories and, to a lesser extent, agency theory. 
Building on the concept of board capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), there is a widely shared 
view that the directors’ human and social capital is a key motivating factor for a CEO to ask 
for advice. However, there are also conflicting views or evidence about the impact of boards 
and other governance mechanisms on CEO advice seeking. First, even though directors’ 
multiple board appointments increase their prestige and perceived value as advisers, they 
restrict their availability and contribution to any single board, which is likely to dampen the 
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likelihood of a CEO asking for guidance from these directors. Second, evidence suggests 
that performance-based incentives may motivate CEOs to seek advice from neutral (objec-
tive) sources of guidance, such as external CEOs who are not their friends; however, incen-
tives may also reinforce advice interactions with “trusted board directors” (hybrid source 
of advice) with whom the CEO has friendship ties or shared tenure. Third, CEO power can 
influence CEOs’ preference of advisers in opposite directions. Powerful CEOs may be more 
reluctant to seek advice from either board or TMT members. However, when powerful CEOs 
appoint favorable individuals to these units, they may be more eager to seek their advice. 
Relatedly, evidence suggests that having some common ground between the CEO and board 
members through a (partially) shared expertise domain helps to establish a two-way commu-
nication and efficient knowledge exchange. However, too much similarity or cloning of the 
CEO’s human capital attributes on the board is bound to be unproductive.
Overall, these findings suggest that the influence of the governance context on CEO 
advice seeking is complex and that nuances have yet to be identified. Moreover, among the 
various governance factors, board process remains largely underexamined. For example, fac-
tors such as board climate, governance orientation and norms, and the frequency of board 
meetings (Boivie et al., 2016; Krause, 2017; Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005) are likely to 
affect CEO advice seeking. Last, there is a limited understanding of how other governance 
mechanisms, reforms, and conditions (e.g., investor activism) and the governance structures 
of different types of firms (e.g., large publicly listed, privately held, new venture, and family 
firms) may influence CEO advice seeking.
Personal Context
Our review indicates that the CEO’s professional and personal attributes are linked to the 
CEO’s advice-seeking behavior. These attributes include the CEO’s managerial experience, 
identity, personality, leadership style, and tenure (Arendt et al., 2005; Barney et al., 1996; G. 
L. Chen et al., 2009; Lomi, Lusher, Pattison, & Robins, 2014; O’Reilly, Doerr, & Chatman, 
2018). In terms of professional experience, research based primarily on information process-
ing theory suggests that a lack of specialized domain experience will prompt the CEO to seek 
expert advice in these areas. For example, when CEOs and their venture team lack industry-
specific experience, they welcome more advice from the VCs in business management 
(Barney et al., 1996). Similarly, the lack of startup experience by the CEO increases advice 
seeking from VCs (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994).
CEO identity/identification is another important antecedent of CEO advice seeking. 
Drawing on social identity theory, scholars suggest that the more CEOs identify with a social 
group, the more likely they will choose individuals from that group as a source of advice (G. 
L. Chen et al., 2009; Lomi et al., 2014; McDonald & Westphal, 2003; Mooney & Amason, 
2011). For example, G. L. Chen et al. (2009) show that when CEOs identify strongly with the 
business elite in general, they have a tendency to interact exclusively with individuals who 
possess high social status (e.g., CEOs of large firms and high-level government officials). 
Similarly, identification with particular social foci within an organization can be an important 
driver of advice seeking. In a study of a multiunit corporate group, Lomi et al. (2014) find that 
business unit managers are more likely to seek advice from other managers of the same unit 
when they strongly identify with this unit. However, they are more likely to seek advice from 
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managers of other units (i.e., boundary crossing) when they identify more strongly with the 
corporate group than their subunit. Furthermore, McDonald and Westphal (2003) note that the 
salience of a CEO’s identification with a particular social group can change over time, which 
in turn may alter the advice-seeking behavior. They argue that managerial anxiety due to com-
pany underperformance can amplify a CEO’s identification with other CEOs with whom they 
have a friendship tie or share a background, resulting in more advice seeking from them.
CEO personality can also influence the CEO’s propensity or proactiveness of seeking 
advice from others. Drawing on the big five model of personality, Jones and Cannella (2011) 
argue that CEOs who rate high on extroversion, openness to experience, and agreeableness 
are more likely to proactively involve board or TMT members in decision making. In addi-
tion, narcissism is negatively linked to CEO advice seeking. O’Reilly et al. (2018) show that 
narcissistic CEOs are more reluctant to ask for advice on legal matters.
An additional personal attribute related to CEO advice seeking is CEO leadership style. 
In their conceptual work on the CEO-adviser model, Arendt et al. (2005) utilize leadership 
theory to stipulate that CEOs who exhibit a transformational leadership style are likely to 
seek advice from their informal networks that reside outside the company. The rationale 
behind this behavior is that as unconventional innovators, transformational CEOs seek new 
opportunities and wish to change the status quo (Bass, 1985). Such endeavors require real-
time nonredundant information that is more likely to be available from external networks. In 
contrast, transactional CEOs tend to be more focused on efficiency and bureaucratic modes 
of governance. They prefer formal advisory systems that can generate internal information 
that can be used to maintain efficiency and controls (Arendt et al., 2005).
Last, a CEO’s company/position tenure is likely to be an important driver for the choice 
of advice source. Building on insights from social network and information processing 
theories, scholars argue that with extended tenure in the position, CEOs will develop closer 
advice relations with the individuals who surround them (Arendt et al., 2005; Barney et al., 
1996). Naturally, outsider CEOs will rely more on external advisers because they lack 
intimate knowledge of the internal individuals. However, once outsider CEOs have had 
enough time to assess the value and character of internal advisers, they are likely to iden-
tify reliable sources of internal advice and replace “those found incompetent or untrust-
worthy with individuals (usually from their informal advisory system) they trust” (Arendt 
et al., 2005: 691).
Key insights. This review has allowed us to observe that the CEO’s personal context 
has received far less research attention than other antecedents. Consistent with a focus on 
individual-level attributes, studies have built on identity, personality, and leadership theories. 
However, many of the proposed arguments are conceptual and have not been empirically 
examined. Given the general scarcity of empirical research on personal context, there are 
only a few conclusive findings. One important finding is the influence of CEO identity, 
which suggests that CEOs have a tendency to rely on advice from members of the social 
group with whom they identify, within and outside the company. These advice networks may 
shift with the evolving CEO identity based on the CEO’s career trajectory, changes in corpo-
rate governance environment, organizational events, and performance outcomes. In addition, 
CEOs’ cognitive capabilities may influence their advice seeking. Future research can exam-
ine whether CEOs with higher cognitive capabilities are better at integrating multiple sources 
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of advice and thus seek more of it. It is also possible that such CEOs seek advice less often 
because of their confidence in their own intellectual capabilities.
Outcomes of CEO Advice Seeking
CEO advice seeking has been associated with a range of outcomes, including outcomes at 
the decision level, the organizational level, the group level of the board and TMT, and the 
individual level of the CEO (for an overview of these studies, see Table S2 in the online sup-
plement). Most of this research has focused on the benefits of advice seeking, while a few 
studies highlight potential negative consequences, such as strategic inertia and TMT conflict.
Decision-Level Outcomes
The most immediate outcomes associated with CEO advice seeking have been decision 
quality and decision speed (Eisenhardt, 1989; Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Levin et al., 2011; 
Walter et al., 2015). Based on a social capital perspective, studies have linked advice seeking 
from “dormant ties” (i.e., former contacts who are currently out of touch) with decision qual-
ity in terms of novelty (Levin et al., 2011; Walter et al., 2015). Specifically, Levin et al. 
(2011: 925) argue that “the knowledge accumulated while a tie lies dormant may well pro-
vide new and unexpected insights if the tie is reconnected.” In an experimental study with 
executive MBA students, the authors show that, after seeking advice from current and dor-
mant ties about specific managerial decisions, the executives gained more novel information 
from their dormant ties than current ones. Using a similar methodology, Walter et al. (2015) 
observe that in reconnecting with dormant ties, managers felt that the advice given by indi-
viduals with whom they did not interact frequently was more helpful in decision making. The 
value gained from advice was also higher when the rekindled contacts were of high status.
In addition to quality, decision speed has been linked to CEO advice seeking. In the con-
text of decision making in high-velocity environments, Eisenhardt (1989) finds that decision 
speed was improved when CEOs focused on advice from the most experienced TMT mem-
bers. Building on information processing theory, the author suggests that a layered advice-
gathering process—that is, seeking input from all TMT members but focusing on advice 
from the most experienced ones—enables CEOs to acquire more information and consider 
more alternatives in a short period than what a centralized or consensus-based decision pro-
cess would allow. Furthermore, a recent study by Garg and Eisenhardt (2017) based on 
resource dependence theory has examined the influence of dyadic versus group advice inter-
actions of the CEO on decision speed. Through four case studies of CEO advice seeking from 
boards of directors, the authors show that dyadic interactions with board members accelerate 
the strategic decision process by allowing the CEOs to have more open yet focused exchanges 
with their directors. In contrast, group advice interactions during a formal board meeting 
restrict in-depth exchange, thereby slowing down or even impeding the decision process. 
These studies show that both the choice of the advice source and the nature of advice interac-
tions influence strategic decision-making speed.
Key insights. Research on the decision-level outcomes of CEO advice seeking has 
been informed by a range of theories, including social capital, information processing, and 
resource dependence theories. However, the amount of research is rather limited. Regarding 
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decision quality, we only know that seeking advice from dormant ties can improve CEOs’ 
decision quality (Levin et al., 2011; Walter et al., 2015). However, research has not examined 
the effects of CEOs’ advice seeking from other adviser categories (e.g., internal vs. external, 
friends vs. nonfriends, intra- vs. extraindustry contacts) on decision quality. Regarding deci-
sion speed, studies show that CEOs gathering layered advice from senior executives and 
engaging in dyadic advice interactions with directors may accelerate strategic decision mak-
ing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017). However, we do not know how utilizing 
other types of advisers may influence decision speed. It is possible that seeking advice from 
certain types of advisers may influence decision quality and decision speed in opposite direc-
tions. For example, advice from external contacts may improve decision quality due to the 
novelty of the perspectives accessed, but it can also slow down the decision process, as novel 
input takes longer to be integrated into the decision and implementation processes.
Organizational Outcomes
Our review indicates that most of the studies on the outcomes of CEO advice seeking have 
focused on organizational outcomes, including a firm’s strategic choice, entrepreneurial ori-
entation, and financial performance. First, utilizing the social network perspective, several 
studies have demonstrated that seeking advice from external versus internal sources can 
affect the firm’s strategic choice, such as the likelihood of strategic change or the choice of 
specific strategies. Although some of these studies refer to the top managers in general rather 
than the CEO (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Yoo & Reed, 2015; Yoo, Reed, Shin, & 
Lemak, 2009), the causal mechanisms are still informative regarding the outcomes of CEO 
advice seeking. Specifically, Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) find that advice from intrain-
dustry ties is associated with the choice of a strategy that conforms to the central tendencies 
of the industry, indicating that the advice was embedded in existing industry recipes. Advice 
from extraindustry ties, however, results in a deviation from industry tendencies, as these 
contacts provide executives with new information and novel ideas (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 
1997). Similarly, advice from intra- and extraindustry ties influences firms’ choice of com-
petitive strategy vis-à-vis first movers (Yoo et al., 2009; Yoo & Reed, 2015). Yoo and col-
leagues find that advice from intraindustry ties is positively related to the adoption of a 
resource-imitation strategy that involves reproducing the leading firm’s resources deploy-
ment strategies. In contrast, advice from extraindustry ties exposes managers to new ideas 
and results in the adoption of a resource-substitution strategy, which involves developing 
alternative resource deployment strategies.
However, studies also reveal that seeking external advice does not guarantee a deviation 
from industry tendencies. On the basis of identity theory, McDonald and Westphal (2003) 
find that seeking advice from other CEOs with similar backgrounds results in strategic per-
sistence. Similarly, G. L. Chen et al. (2009) show that when CEOs with elite identities seek 
advice exclusively from high-status individuals, their reaction to grassroots/bottom-up issues 
slows down. Thus, insular CEO networks (whether internally or externally based) may pro-
mote strategic inertia.
Studies also utilized resource dependence theory to examine the links between advice 
seeking and strategic choice. Oehmichen et al. (2017) show that gaining advice from direc-
tors who are industry experts enables the CEO to initiate strategic change when the relevant 
information is not available from other sources. In a study of family firms, Jones et al. (2008) 
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find that advice from affiliated outside directors who have strong, trust-based ties to the firm 
lowers the perceived risk of diversification and enables its adoption.
Second, research shows that CEO advice seeking can influence a firm’s orientation toward 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Building primarily on information processing and social 
capital perspectives, several studies indicate that advice seeking from a wider range of sources 
enables CEOs to promote an entrepreneurial or innovative orientation in their firms (Alexiev 
et al., 2010; Cao et al., 2015; Cao et al., 2010; van Doorn et al., 2017; Wu, 2008). In identify-
ing opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurial activities, CEOs benefit both from exter-
nal advisers who provide novel information about the market, technologies, and strategic 
alternatives and from internal advisers who offer critical operational knowhow or propose 
new initiatives. For example, Alexiev et al. (2010) find that executives’ internal and external 
advice seeking contributes to their firms’ exploratory innovation, demonstrating that the 
effects of these two types of advice can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
However, if a CEO relies too heavily on internal ties as a source of advice, the firm’s entrepre-
neurial orientation suffers (Cao et al., 2015). These findings suggest that although internal and 
external sources of advice can be uniquely valuable, external advice is highly important for 
innovation and entrepreneurial initiatives (van Doorn et al., 2017) because it diversifies the 
knowledge received from internal sources. Only when the executive team is diverse (e.g., 
expertise and demographics) can it be possible to maintain innovation and strategic renewal 
while relying heavily on internal advice (Alexiev et al., 2010; Kor & Mesko, 2013).
Third, research shows that CEO advice seeking has consequences for firm performance, 
such as firm survival (e.g., Chatterji, Delecourt, Hasan, & Koning, 2019), sales growth (e.g., 
Ashford, Wellman, Sully de Luque, De Stobbeleir, & Wollan, 2018), or profitability and 
market value (e.g., Westphal, 1999). Empirical evidence suggests that the performance effect 
of advice depends on the alignment between the information requirement of the firm’s strat-
egy and the CEO’s advice contacts (Acquaah, 2007; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Yoo 
et al., 2009). Effective strategy implementation requires experience-based expert advice and 
applied knowledge. For example, Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) show that in imple-
menting a strategy that deviates from industry tendencies, firm performance is enhanced 
when executives seek advice from extraindustry ties. Alternatively, for a strategy that con-
forms to industrial tendencies, superior performance is achieved when executives seek advice 
from intraindustry ties. Moreover, Acquaah’s (2007) study of advice ties in Ghana reveals 
that the types of contacts may matter to the success of competitive strategy. They find that 
advice ties with fellow executives and community leaders may be beneficial for all strategy 
types, whereas government ties are more useful for certain strategies.
Other studies have examined the performance effects of hybrid sources (outside directors) 
and internal sources (TMT) of advice based on the perspectives of agency theory, steward-
ship theory, information processing, and human and social capital. Research shows that 
CEOs’ advice seeking from outside directors (Westphal, 1999), VC directors (Sapienza, 
1992), or TMT members (Kim & Lu, 2018) improves financial performance. Board capital 
attributes are positively linked to advice provision to the CEO and firm performance (Khanna, 
Jones, & Boivie, 2014; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009), but performance impact can be contin-
gent on matching the firm’s needs. For instance, seeking advice from operational experts on 
the board is beneficial when the firm’s operational efficiency is declining (Krause et al., 
2013). Stock-based performance of acquisitions improves when executives have access to 
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advice from directors who are experienced in the mergers and acquisitions process or target 
firm industry (Kroll et al., 2008).
Key insights. When compared with the outcomes at other levels, organizational outcomes 
have received the most attention in the CEO advice-seeking literature. Among many insights, 
two strong themes emerged with well-supported results. The first key insight is that when 
CEOs seek advice more from sources cognitively distant from themselves, enabling them to 
bring in novel perspectives and knowledge, their firms pursue strategic change at a higher 
rate, while insular sources of advice (internal or external) promote strategic inertia. Exter-
nally and internally sourced advice can be complementary and jointly promote an entre-
preneurial orientation and innovation-based strategies, but a lack of external advice (from 
cognitively distant and latent sources) is detrimental to innovation. The second key insight 
is that although there are general positive effects of CEO advice seeking from the executive 
team, outside directors, and affiliated directors on firm performance, the effects are stronger 
when there is a fit between the adviser expertise and the strategic needs of the company.
Group-Level Outcomes
CEO advice seeking is closely linked with boards and TMTs, but we have a limited under-
standing of the effects of CEO’s advice-seeking behavior on these groups. Building on 
insights from agency, stewardship, and resource dependence theories, a number of studies 
have argued that CEO advice seeking from the board has complex effects on overall board 
effectiveness. While the CEO’s advice interactions with the board bolsters the effectiveness 
of the board’s advisory role (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Minichilli et al., 2012), it can also 
undermine the board’s monitoring role (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Studies by Westphal 
(1998, 1999) suggest that when CEOs intensify efforts to build friendship ties with outside 
directors (especially when facing an outsider-dominant board), their advice relationships 
with the directors thrive. As more trust is established, CEOs feel more comfortable in seeking 
and accepting advice from the board. However, board oversight effects may be softened at 
the expense of growing (friendly) advisory ties (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). If directors cannot 
simultaneously engage in control and collaboration, dysfunctional cycles of governance may 
be initiated (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).
CEO advice seeking may also influence TMT effectiveness. Building on the theory of 
humble leadership, Ashford et al. (2018) find that when CEOs seek feedback from their TMT 
members on their leadership, TMT members’ collective sense of potency (i.e., positive 
beliefs about the team’s effectiveness) is improved. Managers feel that their opinions and 
perspectives are valued and appreciated, which in turn boosts their confidence and percep-
tion of high TMT effectiveness. However, CEO advice seeking can also have negative group-
level consequences, such as TMT conflict. In their study of new CEOs, Ma and Seidl (2018) 
find that CEOs seeking advice from a few selected members of their TMT resulted in inter-
personal conflict and tension, as certain members felt left out from the decision process.
Key insights. Research on the group-level outcomes of CEO advice seeking is very lim-
ited, but it draws on multiple theoretical perspectives. One key insight concerns the con-
trasting effects of CEO-board advice interactions on board effectiveness. CEO-board advice 
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interactions may strengthen the effectiveness of the board advisory function, but they may 
weaken the board monitoring function. This contrasting effect may be more common when 
the advisory role is deepened due to building friendship ties between the CEO and direc-
tors (because of oversocialization and the use of social influence tactics by the CEO). In 
other contexts, such as new ventures, the advisory function of the board can be quite promi-
nent without compromising the oversight function, possibly because agency issues are less 
prevalent in younger firms (Kor & Misangyi, 2008). Overall, we have limited empirical 
understanding of these interdependent effects. A second key insight concerns the potentially 
contrasting effects of CEO advice seeking from the executive team. On the one hand, advice 
seeking may increase TMT effectiveness by signaling the value of its members’ advice; on 
the other hand, it can result in negative outcomes, such as TMT conflict, if members receive 
differential treatment as potential advice sources. Further research is needed to reconcile 
these findings.
CEO-Level Outcomes
CEO-level outcomes of advice seeking have received hardly any attention in the literature. 
Only two studies focus on the effects of advice seeking on the CEO’s leadership effectiveness. 
McDonald and Westphal (2011), using social capital theory, find that seeking advice from other 
fellow CEOs about personal problems has a positive effect on the CEO’s leadership effective-
ness. Advice from fellow CEOs who experienced similar personal problems helps CEOs cope 
with their own problems and reduces the anxiety and depression they cause. In a second study 
based on the theory of humble leadership, Ashford et al. (2018) show that seeking advice from 
TMT members about leadership behavior improves the CEO’s leadership effectiveness.
Key insights. Research on the individual-level outcomes of CEO advice seeking has 
focused merely on a single outcome variable (i.e., leadership effectiveness). This has yielded 
one key insight, based on social capital and leadership theory: CEO advice seeking from 
TMT members and fellow CEOs can increase the CEO’s leadership effectiveness. Further 
research of this type is needed to generate a more comprehensive understanding of the indi-
vidual-level outcomes—in terms of other potential outcome variables (beyond leadership 
effectiveness) and other potential sources of advice (beyond TMT members and other CEOs).
An Extended Framework and Research Agenda
Using Figure 1 as a synthesizing framework, we brought together the growing yet dispersed 
literature on CEO advice seeking. Our review helped us identify important research gaps in the 
literature, which are indicated as new elements in Figure 1 in addition to existing ones. In this 
section, we develop a research agenda by (1) extending the synthesizing framework to outline 
new empirical foci, (2) proposing new and promising theories for conceptualizing the phenom-
enon, and (3) calling for fruitful yet underutilized methods to study CEO advice seeking.
New Empirical Foci for Studying CEO Advice Seeking
Our review shows that while the literature has generated rich insights about the drivers and 
outcomes of CEO advice seeking, we know relatively little about the process of advice 
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seeking—that is, what happens between the antecedents and the outcomes. To fully understand 
the CEO advice-seeking phenomenon and how it relates to various antecedents and outcomes, 
we must increase our knowledge of this dynamic process. To this end, we have added two new 
building blocks to the CEO advice-seeking continuum: a CEO’s intentions for advice seeking 
and a CEO’s advice utilization, which precede and follow the main act of advice seeking (as 
shown in Figure 1 and indicated by dotted rectangles). Moreover, we captured additional fea-
tures of the choice of advice sources and advice interactions (indicated by italics in Figure 1) 
that warrant further research, such as the formality of the advisory role and the frequency and 
reciprocity of advice interactions. Furthermore, we point to the need for research that examines 
the interaction effects of different antecedents on CEOs’ advice-seeking behavior. Last, we 
highlight the need for future research to pay more attention to microlevel outcomes at the deci-
sion or CEO level (e.g., cognitive overload, reduction in discretion, and CEO health). We now 
elaborate on these key areas of the research gap and proposed research directions by following 
the sequential flow in Figure 1. In addition, in Table 1 we provide sample research questions for 
these newly identified future research areas.
Interactive effects of different antecedents. Research has provided numerous insights into 
the roles of various drivers in CEO advice seeking (i.e., strategic, governance, and a CEO’s 
personal context); however, we lack research on how different drivers work jointly to influ-
ence advice seeking. Our review suggests that while some of the contextual drivers may 
complement each other, others contradict one another. For example, a dynamic environ-
ment requires a CEO to rely on advice from external sources (Heyden et al., 2013), but due 
to personal attributes, such as identity and personality, CEOs may prefer internal advisory 
systems (Arendt et al., 2005). These interactions may motivate new research questions. For 
example, how do governance norms and practices influence and interact with a CEO’s per-
sonal attributes, such as identity and leadership style, and drive advice-seeking behavior? 
When do the substantive advice needs of the firm overrule the tendency of a CEO to confide 
in like-minded individuals?
We find that there is significant value in research that considers how these interaction 
effects play out through CEOs’ configuration of their TMTs. TMT members are among the 
most accessible advice contacts for the CEO; thus, how CEOs configure their management 
teams matters to the quality of advice they receive. On the one hand, in response to needs 
based on the strategic context, CEOs may surround themselves with executives with a diverse 
set of skills and mind-sets (Kor & Mesko, 2013). On the other hand, driven by identity or 
values, CEOs may look for affirmation of their ideas and thus promote executives with simi-
lar views (McDonald & Westphal, 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). However, how do these 
potentially conflicting forces come into play as CEOs create and modify their management 
teams, which drives their likelihood of and reasons for utilizing TMT members for advice? 
Likewise, how do CEOs balance the need for diversity of expertise and perspectives with the 
need to have commonality and a shared understanding with their advisers, as both approaches 
have their advantages?
The interactive effects of the antecedents are also relevant for the board of directors, 
which is arguably the only advice source where the CEO has limited power in reconfiguring 
the advice unit or choosing to engage with it. At times, boards can be the primary source of 
objective and novel advice for the CEO relative to other sources. Future research can exam-
ine how board structure and process may interact in promoting an environment conducive to 
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CEO advice seeking without compromising the board’s oversight function. Research may 
also examine how interactions among the firm’s strategic needs, the CEO’s personal context, 
and board capital and process jointly shape the CEO-board advice relationship.
Furthermore, one can examine the relative influence of the internally sourced ideas and 
proposals from the TMT versus those generated by “outsiders” such as nonexecutive direc-
tors. Menon and Pfeffer (2003) reveal how internally competitive organizations are biased in 
Table 1
Future Research Agenda With Sample Questions
Empirical focus Research questions
Interaction effects of antecedents •   How do different antecedents interact in driving CEOs’ choice of 
advisers?
•  How do strategic, governance, and personal contexts jointly influence 
the way in which CEOs configure the TMT for advice seeking?
•   How do strategic, governance, and personal contexts jointly influence 
CEOs’ advice interactions with the board?
CEO intentions of advice seeking •   How do different antecedents affect intentions for CEO advice 
seeking?
•   How do CEOs’ substantive, symbolic, and relational intentions 
interrelate in shaping CEO advice-seeking behaviors?
•   How do specific intentions mediate the relationship between the 
antecedents and CEO advice seeking?
Selection of advice sources •   When do CEOs seek advice from formal versus informal advisers and 
with what consequences?
•   What are the factors that influence the utilization of multiple advice 
sources for a single decision, and how do CEOs sequence these advice 
interactions?
•   How does the number of advice sources influence advice utilization 
and outcomes?
Nature of advice interactions •   How do various antecedents and CEO intentions influence CEOs’ 
choice of formality or frequency of advice interactions?
•   How does the nature of advice interactions (e.g., tone) relate to the 
different sources of advice? Are there systematic differences in the 
way that CEOs interact with different advice sources?
•   How do frequency, reciprocity, and tone of advice interactions 
influence CEO’s advice utilization and advice outcomes?
Advice utilization •   How do the different antecedents and CEO intentions affect advice 
utilization?
•   How does advice utilization mediate CEO advice seeking (i.e., choice 
of advice sources, nature of advice interactions, and type of advice) 
and the different levels of outcome?
•   How do CEOs combine advice from multiple sources and different 
types of advice?
Microlevel and negative outcomes •   How does CEO advice seeking affect microlevel outcomes (decision, 
group, and individual levels)?
•   When/how does CEO advice seeking lead to negative outcomes, such 
as cognitive overload, group conflict, and reduction in the CEO’s 
discretion?
•   How do CEOs balance different negative and positive outcomes of 
advice seeking?
Note: CEO = chief executive officer; TMT = top management team.
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favor of external knowledge, viewing them as more novel and superior than internal knowl-
edge, which receives more scrutiny and critique. By the same token, in a governance climate 
where directors are actively involved in strategy formulation (McDonald & Westphal, 2010), 
there is a possibility of board ideas competing with TMT ideas (Roberts et al., 2005) and a 
potential bias for board-generated solutions resulting in dismissal of valuable managerial 
insights. Future research can examine how different combinations of contextual conditions 
(strategic, governance, and personal) may introduce a bias for a certain type of advice source.
CEO intentions. Another important area for future research involves the CEO’s intentions 
or motivations for seeking advice. Even though research acknowledges the existence of dif-
ferent intentions, we lack systematic research that examines how different intentions mediate 
the relationship between antecedents and advice-seeking behavior. Most studies implicitly 
assume that seeking advice is triggered by the motivation to obtain substantive advice to deal 
with specific issues (Arendt et al., 2005). As the strategic context, governance context, and 
the CEO’s personal context impose specific information requirements on strategic decision 
making, CEOs will seek substantive information and suggestions to meet those requirements 
(e.g., Alexiev et al., 2010; Heyden et al., 2013).
However, CEO advice seeking is also motivated by symbolic or relational concerns. 
Symbolic concerns have been noted in the psychology-based (general) advice-seeking litera-
ture (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; MacGeorge & Van Swol, 2018) but have not been closely 
examined in CEO advice-seeking research. In this case, CEOs may consult reputable advisers 
as a symbolic act of management (Pfeffer, 1981) to enlist them as experts or references to sup-
port specific decisions (Cross, Borgatti, & Parker, 2001). CEOs may approach individual 
board members to vet ideas ahead of the proposal discussions during board meetings to influ-
ence their opinions (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Likewise, if CEOs regularly seek input 
from their executive teams, they are likely to receive better support and compliance from 
executives who feel valued and appreciated. Alternatively, advice seeking may help a CEO 
share the responsibility of adopted decisions with advisers (e.g., board members). In the event 
of poor performance, prior advice seeking can soften the blame on the CEO. For that matter, 
symbolic advice seeking may be prevalent for decisions made under uncertainty where calcu-
lating CEOs may utilize advice seeking as a self-risk-hedging device. Currently, we lack a 
clear understanding of how often these scenarios occur and what implications they have.
In addition, advice seeking may be motivated by relational concerns. Without regular 
advice interaction, advice contacts may fade away from the CEO’s advice network and become 
inaccessible in the future (Nebus, 2006). Hence, CEOs may strategically consult existing 
advice sources to maintain these advice relations, just as they reach out to new advice sources 
to enlarge their existing advice network (Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Westphal et al., 2006). For 
firms that occupy peripheral positions in business networks (e.g., smaller or younger compa-
nies), a CEO’s proactive advice-seeking efforts to maintain and increase the company’s net-
work size and centrality are crucial for success (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).
However, the wider psychology and management literature also points to concerns about 
the potential “social costs” of advice seeking (Lee, 2002). Advice seekers often fear that they 
will look incompetent in the eyes of potential advisers even though evidence indicates that 
advice seeking often promotes a positive perception of the advice seeker’s competence 
(Brooks, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2015). Similarly, Menon and Pfeffer (2003) show that 
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managers often fear losing status and weakening their position in the organization if they 
utilize knowledge and solutions developed by their internal colleagues. Such fears can influ-
ence the CEO’s choice of advice sources. To avoid a potential negative impression, CEOs 
may hesitate to seek advice from certain sources, such as the board of directors (Sundaramurthy 
& Lewis, 2003) or TMT colleagues, and instead approach others, such as trusted fellow 
CEOs (McDonald & Westphal, 2003). Likewise, advice seekers face the risk of advice con-
tacts not responding to their requests, which can deter advice seeking (Levin et al., 2011; 
Walter et al., 2015). For this reason, they may opt for safer contacts with friendship ties or 
similar views, which has been shown to constrain the “interpretative repertoire” of the CEO 
(Heavey & Simsek, 2015: 944).
In summary, insights from the broader advice-seeking literature suggest that there is merit 
to further researching a CEO’s advice-seeking intentions, as these are likely to have implica-
tions for choosing the adviser, whether (and how) the advice is utilized, and the consequences 
that follow. Because CEO intentions mediate the effects of the antecedents of advice seeking, 
examining how various intentions interrelate can lead to a more nuanced understanding of 
how the influences of strategic, governance, and personal contexts are channeled into the 
advice-seeking process and behavior. For example, symbolic intentions may follow substan-
tive intentions, such as when a CEO initially seeks substantive advice but then also uses the 
advice interactions to gain legitimacy. Alternatively, advice seeking may be primarily moti-
vated by symbolic purposes (e.g., impression management), which could be followed by a 
substantive act of implementing the advice when the CEO is sold on its merit. Some CEOs 
may have a general inclination toward advice seeking for symbolic versus substantive rea-
sons, while others act with different motives in different occasions. These patterns may affect 
a CEO’s career success and firm performance. Last, CEOs may experience conflict among 
multiple motivations. Wanting to maintain a certain advice relationship may direct a CEO to 
a particular source, while the need to obtain substantive advice may require a different source. 
CEOs may need to balance the benefits and costs of seeking advice, such as gaining useful 
advice while revealing their lack of expert knowledge.
Advice sources: New features. Our review suggests that different categories of advice 
sources are based on the location of the advisers in relation to the CEO (e.g., internal, hybrid, 
external) or their cognitive distance from him or her. In addition, it may be helpful to con-
sider the formality of the adviser role. Some advisers occupy formal advisory positions, 
while others act from more informal ones. Advisers with formal advisory roles include 
board and TMT members, internal and external consultants, or members of business round 
tables (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Kipping & Clark, 2012; 
Michel & Kammerlander, 2015; Reay, Pearson, & Gibb Dyer, 2013). Here, the formality of 
the advisory role is independent of the formality of advice interactions; that is, formal advis-
ers can interact formally and informally with the CEO and vice versa (cf. Strike, 2013; Strike 
& Rerup, 2016).
Informal advisers, in turn, include any internal or external individuals who do not have an 
official advisory role. Acknowledging the degree of formality of the adviser role is important 
for several reasons. First, formal advisers are typically expected to advise the CEO and thus 
readily available for advice seeking. Thus, to ensure their availability, CEOs may deliber-
ately appoint them as formal advisers to the TMT or board (Kim & Lu, 2018; Ma & Seidl, 
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2018). Second, when CEOs have lower discretion to appoint their formal advisers (e.g., due 
to governance measures or the irreplaceability of certain executives), these advisers may 
become subject to the symbolic functions of CEO advice seeking (cf. Westphal, 1998).
Furthermore, research has overlooked the number of advisers with whom a CEO engages 
for a single issue, which is different than the overall extensiveness of CEO advice ties (e.g., 
Cao et al., 2015). As CEOs often face complex challenges, they may engage multiple sources 
of advice and constituents. Paying systematic attention to the number of advisers involved is 
important because it may affect decision quality and speed. Relatedly, future research can 
examine the very process of advice seeking from multiple advisers and its potential conse-
quences. This includes the sequence in which the CEO engages in advice interactions with 
the different advisers and the process of dealing with complementary or conflicting advice 
(an issue we examine in discussing advice utilization).
Nature of advice interactions: New features. Our review indicates that there is currently 
only limited insight into the nature of advice interactions. We suggest three potential avenues 
here. First, there is limited research on the importance of the frequency of the advice interac-
tion—that is, the extent to which the CEO repeatedly interacts with a particular source of 
advice. While some studies measure frequency of advice seeking from particular sources 
(e.g., Sapienza et al., 1996), they have treated this construct in terms of the amount of 
advice received rather than the repetitive nature of advice interactions. In contrast to one-off 
exchanges, such repeated advice interactions may give the adviser a better view of the CEO’s 
strategic and organizational challenges and enable both CEO and adviser to develop a com-
mon language and understanding that promote knowledge transfer. Conversely, one-off or 
infrequent advice interactions enable the CEO to reach different sources of novel information 
and insight within the organization or externally. For example, interactions with front-line 
managers and employees may grant the CEO access to real-time information about ongoing 
changes in the competitive environment. Given the high demands on the CEO’s time and 
attention, new research can expand our knowledge of how effectively CEOs balance the ben-
efits of deep advisory relationships versus those of one-off or infrequent advice interactions.
Second, reciprocity is another important aspect of advice interactions. CEO advice seek-
ing can be either unidirectional or reciprocal. When interactions are reciprocal, the advisers 
may be more willing to engage, as they may receive advice or help in turn (Caimo & Lomi, 
2015). The reciprocal nature of the advice interactions may deepen the relationship and allow 
exchange of advice on a broader range of issues, such as advice on strategy, leadership, and 
even personal issues. What drives the reciprocity of advice interactions warrants further 
examination. Peer-to-peer relationships with a comparable power/authority balance may be 
more conducive to such exchanges, although a CEO’s most conveniently accessible relation-
ships are asymmetrical in position and power (e.g., board of directors and TMT). The natu-
rally lower inclination of nonexecutive board members to seek advice from the CEO (e.g., to 
preserve their impartiality) reinforces a one-sided advice relationship. This underscores the 
inherent challenge of reciprocity in some key CEO advice relationships and the vulnerability 
of the CEOs to a dearth of rich advice exchanges.
Third, the tone of advice interactions can be important. In particular, as the communica-
tion and discourse literature on advice shows, the politeness of delivering advice varies 
across advice interactions and can influence how the advice seeker perceives the quality of 
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the advice and how that advice is used (Feng & Feng, 2013; Guntzviller, 2018; MacGeorge, 
Guntzviller, Hanasono, & Feng, 2016). Using a polite tone, the adviser tends to be support-
ive, to acknowledge the advice seeker’s competence, and to respect the autonomy of the 
advice seeker’s ultimate decision. Instead of framing the advice as normative (e.g., “You 
should do X”), an adviser with an unassuming tone may phrase the advice as an option to 
consider (e.g., “You might consider X”; Guntzviller, 2018). We can imagine that in the con-
text of CEO advice seeking, the tone of the conversation is likely to affect the extent to which 
the CEO feels comfortable or threatened while interacting with the adviser. This will in turn 
affect the CEO’s likelihood of utilizing the advice and seeking advice from that adviser in the 
future. New studies on the tone of advice interactions may make important contributions to 
CEO advice-seeking research.
CEO advice utilization. In examining the effects of CEO advice seeking, past research 
has implicitly assumed that the solicited advice is often utilized; however, this assumption 
may not reflect reality. The broader literature on advice shows that advice utilization may 
take different forms (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino & Schweitzer, 2008; Gino, Shang, & 
Croson, 2009; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). First, the advice seeker may simply adopt or fol-
low the advice received, which is referred to as incorporating the advice. Research shows 
that advice seekers are more likely to incorporate advice in their final decisions if the advice 
source is trustworthy and knowledgeable (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), if the advice interaction 
takes place in a friendly and polite tone (Feng & Feng, 2013; Guntzviller, 2018; MacGeorge, 
Guntzviller, et al., 2016), and if advice is sought under high anxiety and low self-confidence 
(Gino et al., 2012). Advice utilization rate is also higher when the advisee pays for it (Gino, 
2008). Second, the advice seeker may discount the advice—that is, underweighting or dis-
carding the advice received (Van Swol, Paik, & Prahl, 2018). A robust finding in the psychol-
ogy literature is that individuals tend to underweight advice from others and favor their own 
opinions, a phenomenon called “egocentric bias” (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). This is par-
ticularly likely to happen when the advice seeker is powerful and knowledgeable (See, Mor-
rison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012; Yaniv, 2004). Studies show that 
the degree of underweighting advice depends on the nature of the relationship to the adviser, 
such as the degree of rivalry (Menon & Blount, 2003; Menon, Thompson, & Choi, 2006), 
and the demographic similarity between the adviser and advisee. Gino et al. (2009: 287) find 
that in judging others’ actions, information from a dissimilar adviser is more heavily weighed 
than information from a similar adviser, but in judging one’s own actions, information from a 
similar adviser carries more weight than information from a dissimilar adviser. Third, advice 
utilization may involve combining advice from multiple sources. The psychology literature 
shows that after obtaining advice from different people, the advice seeker may combine 
conflicting advice in different ways, such as averaging viewpoints or discarding extreme 
opinions (Harries, Yaniv, & Harvey, 2004; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). Yaniv and Milyavsky 
(2007) identify a tendency of egocentric trimming, whereby individuals favor advice similar 
to their own opinion and discard dissimilar views.
All three types of advice utilization—incorporating, discounting, and combining—are rel-
evant in the CEO context. CEOs may discount advice from others, as they are highly powerful 
and knowledgeable individuals and thus prone to egocentric bias. Empirically, we know little 
about when and how CEOs discount advice, which can be a common occurrence in the case 
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of symbolic advice seeking. We imagine that combining advice is also a prominent practice 
for CEOs. They regularly make complex decisions under uncertainty, thereby seeking advice 
from multiple sources that must be combined and reconciled before they make a final deci-
sion. Using insights from the broader advice literature, future research can examine how all 
three advice-utilization choices by the CEO affect micro- and macrolevel outcomes.
Microlevel and negative outcomes. Our review has revealed the diversity of outcomes 
that CEO advice seeking yields but also indicates that the majority of the studies focus on 
organizational outcomes. Future research must pay more attention to how macrolevel out-
comes are generated by microlevel outcomes at the decision, group, and individual levels. 
For example, although past research explored the direct links between CEO advice seeking 
and firm-level outcomes, the links between advice seeking and intermediary variables such 
as quality and speed of strategic decision making were overlooked. Tracking micro- and 
group-level intermediary mechanisms can help uncover the causal relations through which 
CEO advice seeking and utilization play out.
To capture the full range of outcomes of CEO advice-seeking behavior, researchers may 
also consider the potential effects of advice interactions on the CEO’s health and well-being. 
As we know from the broader literature on advice seeking (e.g., Athanasopoulou & Dopson, 
2018; Gino et al., 2012; Stephan, 2018), reaching out for advice can be an important coping 
mechanism during times of crisis at work or in one’s personal life. Stress is a perennial aspect 
of an executive’s career, and it can reach levels where CEOs, who are often seen as organi-
zational heroes, may seriously struggle (Frost & Robinson, 1999). Executives are predis-
posed to taking action and multitasking; they are always on the move and rarely have time 
for reflection or introspection. This way of working can put their health at risk, especially if 
they lack the skills to understand their emotions and cope with high levels of uncertainty and 
performance pressure (Kets de Vries, 1995; Quick, Cooper, Gavin, & Quick, 2008). Advice 
interactions can be a substantial relief for CEOs from the intellectual and psychological 
standpoints. Sharing concerns and discussing difficult aspects of business and personal mat-
ters may help to relieve some of the inherent managerial anxiety. As most corporations 
already suffer from a shortage of top talent in the executive labor markets (Kor & Mesko, 
2013), future research can help us gain insights into how to promote CEO and executive 
health and well-being through a range of advice interactions.
Furthermore, we need more research on the costs and adverse effects of advice seek-
ing. While past research has focused on the benefits and positive outcomes of CEO advice 
seeking, a few studies have examined negative outcomes, such as strategic inertia and 
team conflict. Other negative effects may include cognitive overload (Sutcliffe & Weick, 
2008), which can be caused by contradictory advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). The 
broader advice literature suggests that the more heterogeneous the advice one receives, 
the harder it is to process and integrate different pieces of advice, which can impede 
decision-making quality and speed (Sah & Loewenstein, 2015; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; 
Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007).
An additional negative CEO-level outcome of advice seeking is the potential reduction in 
CEO’s discretion in decision making (Dalal & Bonaccio, 2010), particularly when seeking 
advice from boards or TMTs. After CEO advice seeking, board members may become keenly 
interested in an issue and monitor it, which may restrict the CEO’s autonomy in decision 
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making. Even when they do not, CEOs may feel compelled to follow the advice sought. To 
protect their discretion, CEOs may choose sources with less interference. More generally, 
these negative effects also raise a crucial question about how skillfully a CEO can balance 
the positive and negative consequences of advice seeking and whether one can become more 
skilled at this balancing act over time.
New Theoretical Perspectives for Studying CEO Advice Seeking
The existing literature contains a range of different theoretical perspectives from which to 
examine CEO advice seeking. The most widely utilized theoretical perspectives include 
information processing theory, resource dependence theory, human capital theory, network 
and social capital theories, social identity and leadership theories, and agency theory. Several 
other theoretical frameworks have been utilized in studies but to a lesser degree (see Table S2 
in the online supplement). In addition to these theories, we wish to highlight three promising 
theoretical perspectives that are central to management studies and upper echelons research, 
but that surprisingly have not been used thus far in CEO advice-seeking research.
Attention-based view. The first theoretical approach is the attention-based view of the 
firm, which was developed in strategic management (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio, Laamanen, & 
Vaara, 2018) and later applied in specific research streams, such as upper echelons research 
(Cho & Hambrick, 2006). There are at least three ways in which this perspective is relevant 
to CEO advice seeking. First, advice seeking can affect which issues (or aspects of issues) 
a CEO takes notice of and engages with. Here, the role of the adviser is not about providing 
input for handling preexisting issues (which the traditional information processing approach 
would focus on) but more about influencing what issues the CEO is likely to pay attention to. 
In other words, advice seeking is not only driven by the CEO’s issues but can also generate 
those issues. To the extent that advisers attend to different issues than the CEO does (e.g., 
due to their experience and structural embeddedness), seeking their advice can compensate 
for the blind spots in the CEO’s attention structure. Second, the CEO’s existing attention 
structure affects the potential sources of advice with which he or she will engage. Given the 
particular structures wherein the CEO is embedded, the CEO’s attention will be directed to 
particular advisers and away from others. For example, due to governance and administra-
tive structures, CEOs frequently interact with the board and TMT members. As a result, they 
are likely to “attend” to them as potential advisers than to others. Hence, to understand why 
a CEO seeks advice from particular sources and not others, one might need to understand 
how his or her attention is structured. Third, the CEOs’ attention structure also affects how 
they will deal with the advice they get (i.e., advice utilization). Specifically, when receiving 
multiple and potentially conflicting pieces of advice, the CEOs’ attention structure can help 
explain what advice they will focus on. For example, CEOs are likely to pay more attention 
to a piece of advice that is repeatedly delivered through different communication channels 
(e.g., different committees) than advice heard only once.
Neo-institutional theory. The second theoretical perspective we wish to highlight is neo-
institutional theory (Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017; Scott, 2013), which is 
one of the most prominent theories in management studies to date. Although Minichilli et al. 
(2012) have hinted at the relevance of this theory in their cross-country comparison of the 
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boards’ advisory task performance, advice-seeking research has not yet systematically applied 
this theory. A neo-institutional perspective directs researchers’ attention to the societal institu-
tions that define which advice-seeking behavior is appropriate for CEOs and which is not. 
This has important implications. First, concerns about legitimacy may drive the CEO’s choice 
of advice sources. For example, in publicly listed firms, CEOs are expected to consult with 
the board, but it might be inappropriate for them to consult with their family members or the 
CEOs of competitors. However, these expectations can be very different in family firms or 
entrepreneurial ventures. The legitimacy concern may drive the CEO to advisers other than 
those whom they would choose purely on the basis of the fruitfulness of their advice. This ten-
dency to select advice sources based on legitimacy concerns is more pronounced when advice 
seeking is primarily driven by symbolic intentions. For example, in seeking the cooperation 
of constituents for a decision related to employee welfare, it would be helpful to seek advice 
from employee representatives as highly legitimate advisers. Second, when it is inappropriate 
to seek advice from particular advice sources, CEOs can refrain from appointing them to offi-
cial advisory positions but still interact with them informally. In this way, CEOs can preserve 
their legitimacy by shielding their inappropriate behavior from public scrutiny. Third, the per-
ceived conformity of a CEO’s advice-seeking behavior with societal institutions can affect the 
legitimacy of the CEO and his or her leadership effectiveness. Such conformity can also affect 
the legitimacy of the organization as a whole, which then shapes the availability of resources 
and overall firm performance. Thus, the neo-institutional theory provides a novel perspective 
that can explain the multilevel outcomes of CEO advice seeking.
Practice theory. Practice theory is a prominent theoretical lens in management studies 
(Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Nicolini, 2012) and upper echelons research (Jarzabkowski, 
2008; Ma, Seidl, & Guérard, 2015). At the heart of this perspective, there are three key 
assumptions: (1) Our social world comprises a network of interrelated social practices or rou-
tinized types of behavior that provide individuals with a kind of blueprint for action; (2) the 
particular social practices that individuals are socialized into shape how they act and interact 
with others; and (3) enacting social practices requires particular skills from the individual.
This perspective has important implications for conceptualizing CEO advice seeking. First, 
CEO advice seeking can be understood as a particular set of social practices. That is, there are 
prescribed ways of approaching people and seeking their advice. For example, seeking advice 
from board members may entail a different set of practices than seeking advice from fellow 
CEOs. Researchers can comparatively examine these practices. Second, enacting advice-
seeking practices requires a CEO’s experience and skills. Thus, the specific advice-seeking 
behavior that a CEO exercises can change as she or he becomes more skillful in enacting dif-
ferent advice-seeking practices. Third, we may pay attention to the role of tools and material-
ity in a CEO’s practice of advice seeking. For example, there is an emerging need to understand 
how new technologies, such as big data–driven business intelligence and artificial intelligence 
(e.g., robot-advisers), may change or create new CEO advice-seeking practices. Fourth, simi-
lar to all practices, advice-seeking practices are embedded into a network of other practices. 
For example, advice-seeking practices may be linked to decision-making practices. The 
broader system of relationships among related practices may collectively drive the impact of 
CEO advice seeking on decision making. Developing an understanding of the components of 
the system and its interlinks may yield insights into the interdependent mechanisms underly-
ing more or less effective advice-seeking practices.
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Methodological Opportunities for Studying CEO Advice Seeking
Our review of the literature shows that, to date, researchers have mobilized a host of dif-
ferent methodologies to examine CEO advice seeking. These include large-sample studies 
based on archival data (e.g., Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Kim & Lu, 2018) and survey 
data (e.g., Heyden et al., 2013; McDonald et al., 2008), experiments (e.g., Bridwell-Mitchell 
& Lant, 2014; Walter et al., 2015), case studies (e.g., Garg & Eisenhardt, 2017; Ma & Seidl, 
2018), and mixed methods (e.g., O’Reilly et al., 2018). Our review shows that archival- and/
or survey-based large-sample studies have been the most common methods. These studies 
have generated numerous insights into the macropatterns of CEO advice seeking, including 
strategy- and governance-related antecedents and organizational-level outcomes.
However, our review also revealed a lack of studies that mobilize methods that can capture 
the microlevel and temporal dynamics of CEO advice seeking. This is probably why we have 
a very limited understanding of the CEO advice-seeking process and the microlevel outcomes 
that it yields. Despite being underutilized, two methods have been shown to be effective in 
addressing this gap. We briefly highlight their strengths to draw attention to these methods.
First, in-depth case studies are particularly suitable for exploring the process of CEO 
advice seeking, as this method can identify the activities through which CEOs seek and uti-
lize advice. For example, Garg and Eisenhardt (2017) demonstrate how case studies can help 
us understand the micropatterns of CEO–board advice interactions, revealing practices that 
are highly effective. In addition to identifying the linkages among the process elements dis-
cussed earlier (see Figure 1), given its exploratory nature this approach can help us discover 
other important process elements that shape CEO advice seeking and related outcomes. To 
be sure, gaining access for this kind of data collection can be difficult due to the sensitivity 
of the data and the time constraints of CEOs. However, the challenge of gaining access is 
often overstated. For example, Ma and Seidl (2018) report that out of the 15 CEOs they 
approached, eight accepted to participate in an extensive study of TMT dynamics.
Second, experiments can be effective in generating knowledge about the microdynamics 
of CEO advice seeking. Although it is difficult to simulate the complexity of CEO advice 
seeking in a laboratory, well-designed experiments can capture some basic cognitive and 
behavioral mechanisms. For example, using a sample of executive MBA students, Levin 
et al. (2011) simulated an advice-seeking context and were able to show the value of seeking 
advice from dormant ties and explain why CEOs refrained from using them. These insights 
into the value of dormant ties as a novel advice source would have been difficult to discover 
through other methods because CEOs do not regularly seek advice from dormant ties. We can 
imagine that experiments can be useful for identifying mechanisms or relationships that are 
difficult to capture with archival data sets. For example, experiments may be useful in iden-
tifying how CEOs combine conflicting advice from multiple sources, which can be subtle 
and difficult to observe.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed the burgeoning but dispersed literature on CEO advice 
seeking. Using an integrative framework, we synthesized research findings to generate a 
more holistic and comprehensive understanding of CEO advice seeking. The review has 
revealed important research gaps and helped us develop a research agenda that extends the 
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current scope of analysis. We hope that this review contributes to advancing CEO advice-
seeking research from an emergent stage to a well-grounded, paradigmatic field of study. 
Given the complexity of a CEO’s job and its far-reaching effects on business and society, 
research on CEO advice seeking is likely to bear fruit in multiple ways.
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Note
1. As is common in literature searches, a combination of a word or an unfinished word and “*” was used to 
capture the different variations of that word. For example, “advi*” can capture “advice,” “advising,” “adviser(s),” 
“advisor(s),” and “advisory.”
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